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THE CASPIAN DISPUTE: IS A DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS TOO
LATE OR CAN WE TURN BACK THE HANDS OF TIME?
HOUMAN AFsHAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost a decade and a half have passed since the breakup of
the Soviet Union, but its effects have left the unsettled state of the
Caspian a regional problem that is yet to be resolved.' That prob-
lem has been aggravated by the resulting international implica-
tions, in particular for the countries interested in exploiting
untapped mineral resources in the area. 2 The Caspian market also
exports one of the most expensive foods in the world, Beluga cav-
iar, not to mention the fact that it is home to billions of tons of oil
and natural gas, making it the world's third largest depository of
hydrocarbon reserves.3 To this day, however, a legal regime over
the Caspian region does not exist, making it unclear how such re-
sources should be distributed amongst the littoral states.
4
This Note examines the effects of the post-Soviet split on the
process of establishing a new legal system regulating the Caspian
for all littoral states. This analysis accounts for both the prior legal
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2004; B.A. University of British Colum-
bia, May 2000. The author would like to thank his father, Khosrow Afshar, for the idea.
The author also thanks Professors Sydney Cone and Barry Dubner for their helpful
comments. Finally, if not for the love and support of family, there would have been no
paper for me to write here at New York Law School.
1. See Kamyar Mehdiyoun, Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea, 94
AM. J. INT'L. L. 179, 179 (2000) (stating that the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet
Union has left the legal status of the Caspian Sea as one of the most contentious inter-
national problems facing the region).
2. See Yolbars A. Kepbanov, The New Legal Status of the Caspian Sea is the Basis of
Regional Operation and Stability, 2J. INT'L AFF. 4 (1998), available at http:www.mfa.gov.tr/
grupa/percept/ii4/II4-2.htm. (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).
3. Arthur P. Mizzi, Caspian Sea Oil, Turmoil, and Caviar: Can they Provide a Basis for
an Economic Union of the Caspian States?, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 483, 483
(1996).
4. Id. at 484. (stating that although limited progress was made in a 1993 meeting
held in Astrakhan, Russia, where the Caspian coastal states agreed "in principle" to
define territorial blocks by a median-line method, no formal agreement has been recog-
nized by the littoral states).
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regime (which only regulated Iran and the Soviet Union) and the
rights necessitated by the creation of the newly independent states.
Part II of this Note discusses the historical legal status governing the
Caspian region followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the resulting effect on the regulation of the Caspian. Part III de-
scribes the difficulties inherent in achieving mutual cooperation be-
tween the littoral states. These difficulties are analyzed by focusing
on the special problem of uneven distribution of Caspian resources.
Focus is placed on factors that caused this problem, including the
unique characteristics of the Caspian in relation to the isolated po-
sition of Iran, which historically relied on Treaties it observed with
what is now Russia. Part IV argues that cooperation can exist only
under a new legal regime that accounts for and reverses the inequi-
ties that are already present in the Caspian region. These inequi-
ties are in part the result of unilateral exploitation of resources by
the littoral states. 5 To this day, these states have not mutually
agreed upon set boundaries in the Caspian.6 Part V concludes that
a better and more equitable administration of the Caspian involves
a regime utilizing a flexible approach. This regime incorporates
leasing arrangements into the current oil consortium projects oper-
ating in disputed areas of the Caspian region. Only then can all the
littoral states agree on some method of division in the Caspian
region.
Ii. THE HSTOluCAL STATUS OF THE CASPIAN AND THE LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES THAT FOLLOWED
A. The Kingdom of Persia & The Russian Socialist
Federal Soviet Republic
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, wars between the
declining Kingdom of Persia (now the Islamic Republic of Iran)
and tsarist Russia were predominant in the Caucuses, where the lat-
5. lu. Merzliakov, International Affairs: A Russian Journal, Legal Status of the Cas-
pian, COLUMBIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ONLINE (MAR. 1999), available at http://www.
ciaonet.org/olj/iarj-99mei01.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003) ("The majority of the Cas-
pian problems are caused by a lack of clarity of its legal status . . . Until Azerbaijan
started developing marine oil fields and signed agreements on product sharing with
foreign oil companies talks about the legal status of the Caspian Sea was of a theoretical




ter was driving its territorial limits southward.7 Consequently, Per-
sia's defeat resulted in two treaties that established borders and
defined naval shipping rights in the Caspian.8
It was not until February 26, 1921, that the Treaty of Friend-
ship between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Repub-
lic was signed in Moscow. 9 This treaty established equal rights of
free navigation between the Soviet Union and Iran over what it re-
ferred to as their Caspian Sea.10 The labeling of the Caspian as a
"sea" subsequently became a challenged contention and the legal
ramifications in characterizing the Caspian with any definiteness as
to its geological classification sparked scholarly debates.1' Aside
from this collateral issue, the Treaty of Friendship did not speak to
any country's territorial sovereignty over the Caspian, but was evi-
dence of improving Soviet-Iranian relations.
a2
The 1940 Convention on Commerce and Navigation between
Iran and the U.S.S.R. differed in that it reaffirmed a previously es-
tablished 10 mile fishing zone 13 and allowed certain co-equal activi-
7. Mehdiyoun, supra note 1, at 180.
8. Id.
9. Treaty of Friendship, Feb. 26, 1921, Persia-Russ. SFSR, 9 L.N.T.S. 401 [herein-
after Treaty of Friendship].
10. Id. art.11.
11. Barry Hart Dubner, The Caspian: Is it a Lake, a Sea or an Ocean and does it really
matter? The danger of utilizing unilateral approaches to resolving regional / international issues,
18 DICK. J. INT'L. L. 253, 260 (2000) (Stating that the Caspian has been considered an
inland sea, a major lake and also a relict marine basin. Classification of the Caspian
"body of water" is a source of tension and dispute between the littoral states. The author
argues that the focus of such debates by each state is centered on the dichotomous
concern for the consequent division of resources and protection of "rights" in the Cas-
pian. This concern stems from the classification of the Caspian as a "lake," necessarily
requiring multilateral agreement on how Caspian resources are exploited, and classifi-
cation as an "inland" or "enclosed" sea, which would provide for territorial limits and
open exploitation beyond those limits.).
12. See Treaty of Friendship, supra note 9 (a prelude to the Treaty reads "THE
PERSIAN GOVERNMENT of the one part, and the RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERAL
SOVIET REPUBLIC of the other part, desiring to establish relations of friendship and
fraternity between the two nations, have decided to engage in negotiations for this pur-
pose ...").
13. Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, with Final Protocols and
Annex, Aug. 25, 1935, Iran - U.S.S.R., Art. 15, 176 L.N.T.S. 301, 317 [hereinafter Treaty
of Establishment] (Article 14 states that throughout the Caspian "Sea" there shall be
only vessels belonging to the 2 contracting parties, namely, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics or Iran).
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ties such as fishing beyond that zone.1 4 The right under that treaty
to share equally in Caspian fishing activities is viewed today as re-
mote historical evidence for condominium rights. 15 It was a sub-
stantial right Iran relied on because the Caspian and its inflowing
rivers have always been a valuable fishery resource, home to ninety
percent of the world's sturgeon.
16
In addition to the abovementioned treaties, an exchange of
diplomatic notes dated March 25, 1940, again referred to the Cas-
pian as a Soviet-Iranian "sea", but there is controversy as to what
exactly was meant by this characterization. 17 The characterization
of the Caspian as a lake, sea or an ocean has been considered by
some to be determinative of the legal status over the Caspian,1 8
based on either an application of international law or adherence to
prior Soviet-Iranian treaties as abovementioned. 19 However, as this
contention has been subject to heated debate since the break-up of
the Soviet Union,20 the labeling game itself has been labeled as an
ineffective step towards resolution of this dispute.
2'
14. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 25, 1940, Iran - U.S.S.R., 144 BRIT.
& FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 419 (1940-42) [hereinafter Treaty of Commerce].
15. Eric W. Sievers, The Caspian, Regional Seas, and the Case for a Cultural Study of
Law, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVL. L. REV. 361, 371 (2001) (stating that although the history of
the Caspian offers remote evidence for condominium rights, it does provide support
for community management by only the littoral states).
16. Sergei Vinogradov, Transboundary of the water resources in the former Soviet Union:
Between conflict and cooperation, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 393, 396-97 (1996).
17. Treaty of Establishment, Commerce & Navigation, with Final Protocols and
Annex, supra note 13, at 329.
18. See Sievers, supra note 15, at 370 (2001) (stating that although many interna-
tional legal scholars have focused on the "central legal question" of whether to label the
Caspian as a sea or a lake, this is a political and not a legal question).
19. Dubner, supra note 11, at 281 (stating that the classification debate is more
than academic and centers on dividing the resources and protecting other rights. The
Russians, Iranians, and Turkmen have classified the Caspian as a lake thereby holding
that beyond a limited territorial boundary all littoral states must agree on exploitation
of Caspian resources. The Azerbaijanis and Kazaks, on the other hand, have favored the
Caspian as an inland sea, thereby holding that the Caspian should be treated like other
enclosed seas, with territorial limits and the resources beyond open for exploitation.).
20. Sievers, supra note 15.
21. Dubner, supra note 11, at 281 (stating that an approach of attempting to label
the Caspian as a sea or lake may be irrelevant because an alternate framework set forth
in the Convention and by the International Court of Justice could work as effective
precedent to resolution in this area).
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B. The Collapse of the Soviet Union
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created uncertainty
in the ownership and management of Caspian resources. 22 Instead
of the previous joint-usage of the Caspian by only two countries, the
post-Soviet split saw the Caspian resources divided amongst five
independent states, namely, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia,
and Turkmenistan. 23 Each state now had a competing interest to
fulfill, and the newly independent states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
and Turkmenistan had the additional burden and interest of over-
seeing their evolving economic structures so that they could remain
independent. 24 With newly independent countries bordering the
Caspian coastline and sharing the region's resources, both Russia
and Iran lost control over what they previously viewed as their
"sea."25 In times when oil played an increasingly important role in
gaining independence from the west, Iran could no longer rely on
tradition to maintain its rights in the Caspian.26 The Treaties only
spoke to fishing and naval rights, and clearly the powers that be in
Iran were aware that these natural resources, though bountiful,
were not all the Caspian had to offer anymore.2 7
III. CASPIAN INEQUITIES
Conflict between the littoral states over the legal framework
governing the use and development of the Caspian is in part a
22. Merzliakov, supra note 5.
23. Id.
24. Id. (stating that the newly independent states were concerned with their de-
pendence on Russia. The author argued for a procedural system creating a legal regime
for the area to stabilize the region from the repercussions of the various unilateral
claims of ownership that came about from this concern.).
25. Treaty of Establishment, supra note 13.
26. See The Caspian Sea - The History & Legal Background, NO. 4, Vol. 59, July 22,
2002 INTERNATIONAL LAW NEWSLEYrERS ("After the collapse of the Soviet Union in late
1991, Russia began to be less of a geo-political player in the Caspian region. Gradually,
the five littoral nations of the Caspian became free to develop their oil as they saw fit.").
26 M.S. Nourian, Negareshhay-e motafavet dar barey-e rezhim-e hogugy-e daryay-e
khazar [Alternative Viewpoints on the Caspian's Legal Regime], MAJALLEH, summer
1996, at 112.
27. Sievers, supra note 15, at 364 (stating that oil is not the only "black gold" of the
Caspian. although the turn of the century brought half of the world's oil from fields off
Azerbaijan's coast, caviar is really the "black gold" of the Caspian, being the traditional
source of economic wealth from this region).
20041
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product of the uneven distribution of potential oil and natural gas
in the region.28 The absence of agreed territorial lines is viewed as
one of the largest impediments to a more rapid development of the
Caspian basin's hydrocarbon reserves.2 9 A recent summit of the
five countries' leaders in April of 2002 failed to produce an agree-
ment on even the most basic principles to be applied toward a
resolution.
30
At present, Iran is maintaining the most isolated position on
the division of the Caspian, holding that littoral states should either
(1) use the Sea in common, or (2) divide the floor and water basin
into equal shares.3t Naturally, Iran prefers the first approach,
whereby the littoral states would use the Caspian by consensus, how-
ever impracticable this may be.3 2 Under Iran's second approach of
equal division, each country would have a 20% share of the Caspian
floor and surface.
33
It is important to note that progress towards a mutually agreea-
ble resolution is hindered by the U.S. Iran Libya Sanctions Act
28. Caspian Sea Region: Legal Issues July 2002 available at http://www.eia.doe.
gov/emeu/cabs/casplaw.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Caspian Law
Document].
29. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Dispute Resolution in the Caspian region: What
foreign investors and governments need to know (June, 2002), available at http://www.fresh
fields.com/practice/disputeresolution/publications/pdfs/5109.pdf (last visited Sept.
23, 2003) (see page 9 of the article where it states that Russia has signed bilateral agree-
ments with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to divide the Caspian seabed into national sec-
tors, but Iran continues to press for equal division of the entire seabed while
Turkmenistan seems to favor a compromise).
30. Id.
31. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html [hereinafter EIA Docu-
ment] (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
32. Id. (Usage by consensus is commonly referred to as the "condominium" ap-
proach. Under such an approach, the development and exploitation of the Caspian
would be ajoint effort by all five littoral states. The Iranians suggest that all work under-
taken in the Caspian should be suspended until the legal status of the Caspian is deter-
mined, but this is highly unlikely given the development of oil pipeline consortiums
and other projects that have already attracted foreign investment and interest. The con-
dominium approach is thus regarded as less likely.).
33. Id. (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Russia have agreed on an equidistant method
of division, whereby Iran would receive 12-13% of the Caspian floor and surface due to
its smaller shoreline in relation to the rest of the riparian states. Kazakhstan and Azer-
baijan oppose Iran's 20% proposal stating that it does not correspond to historical tra-
dition. Consequently, on May 20, 2002, Iran and Azerbaijan failed to reach an
agreement on the Caspian division.).
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(hereinafter referred to as the "I.L.S.A.").3 4 These unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions against Iran are a product of U.S. law, rather than
a multilateral organization like the United Nations, and stand as a
considerable obstacle to oil companies who look to the region as a
potential site for low-cost oil production and development.35
Under this act, Washington is said to be working hard to ensure
that its favored routes of oil transport are carried via Azerbaijan's
pipelines at the expense of more expeditious and cost-effective
trans-Iranian routes. This further isolates Iran in its claimed validity
in certain ownership rights over the Caspian region.
36
The United States concedes that such past policies may have
hurt Iran.37 From Iran's standpoint, however, it is only in recent
times that the impact of the I.L.S.A. has significantly hindered its
economic growth. 38 This is especially so when what is at stake in
the Caspian becomes compounded by the synergistic effect of the
I.L.S.A. on Iran's ability to negotiate for a favorable resolution in
the area. 39 It would be far too simplistic, however, to place the en-
34. Upon President Clinton's tightened sanctions on Iran, Congress followed with
legislation of its own. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 17, 1995);
see also The Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 541
(1996), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West Supp. 1999) [hereinafter ILSA].
35. Symposium, Energy and international Law: Development, Litigation, and Regula-
tion, 36 TEx INT'L L.J. 1, 16 (2001) [hereinafter Energy Symposium].
36. Richard Mably, British-Iranian Ties Ease Path for UK Oil Firms (Sept. 25, 1998),
available at http://www.flyingfish.org.uk/articles/rushdie/98-09-25re.htm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Flyfish UK] (quoting Simon Williams: "The Americans are
more committed to controlling the pipeline route than holding back development of
Iranian hydrocarbons.").
37. Energy Symposium, supra note 35, 21-22. (arguing that there is no easy fix for
U.S.-Iranian relations but pointing to Secretary of State Madelaine Albright's historic
speech admitting that past U.S. policies and decisions may have hurt Iran).
38. See M. McCary, End Run on Sanctions (A Case Study on Contemporary Energy Invest-
ment in Iran), 12 FLA. J. INT'L 263, 287-93 (1998) (Stating that U.S.-Iranian sanctions
have generally had only a limited legal impact. Although federal regulations prohibit
companies under U.S. jurisdiction from entering into major Iranian energy contracts,
corporate tenacity in America keeps a foot in the door. Thus, corporations use special
tactics to combat unilateral sanctions laid out by the U.S. government. Under this per-
spective, the author argues that U.S. corporate activity demonstrates a three-fold strat-
egy against the sanctions by way of (1) continuing dialogue for future Iranian
investment relations - which is not prohibited by U.S. sanctions, (2) limited investment
and planning, and (3) merger and partnership agreements.).
39. Jean-Christophe Peuch, Caspian: Dispute highlights poor state of Azerbaijani-
Iranian Ties (August 9, 2001) available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/
0 8 /09082001122320.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2003) (describing an incident inJuly, 2001,
2004]
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tire blame for Iran's ineffective position in the Caspian dispute on
the debilitating effects of the extraterritorial application of unilat-
eral sanctions under the I.L.S.A. .40
The Iranian Foreign Ministry has been criticized for being far
too passive to the point of endangering its own country's interests.
41
Considering that is not surprising Iran was reassured, perhaps fool-
ishly, by Russia's position that all coastal states were bound by the
Soviet-Iranian Treaties, which, according to it, provided for joint
utilization because they were successor states and inherited treaty
obligations of the former unitary state.42 This position, however, is
effectively undercut because of two principles. Firstly, the newly
independent states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) are
considered "new" successor states that succeeded to the territory of
a currently nonexistent state, but without succeeding to its rights
and obligations. 43 Secondly, Russia is the only successor state that
has succeeded to the territory of a currently nonexistent state with
the added benefits and burdens of its former rights and
obligations.
4 4
From Russia's viewpoint, it could benefit considerably from ei-
ther sharing the Caspian with Iran alone, or with Iran and the
where an Iranian warship threatened to fire on an oil exploration vessel operated by
BP-Amoco 150kn southeast of the port of Baku, thereby forcing the vessel to return to
shore. "Tehran's unexpected show of force against its northern neighbor could also be
a side effect of Washington's efforts to convince countries, including Azerbaijan, to
limit ties with Iran.").
40. See Faraz Sanei, The Caspian Sea Legal Regime, Pipeline Diplomacy, and the Prospects
for Iran's Isolation from the Oil and Gas Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran's Legal Options with its
Geopolitical Realities, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 681, at 730 (2001)(stating that
threatened sanctions by the United States under the Iran Libya Sanctions Act, whose
extraterritorial application has been legally challenged as a violation of GATT, though
successful in thwarting U.S. companies, has been criticized and subsequently ignored by
foreign firms).
41. Dr. Houshang Ta'leh, The Caspian Sea and the Violated Rights of Iran, J. ON POL.,
Soc. IssuEs, EcON. & Sci., No. 91, at 65 (arguing that the Iranian Foreign Ministry's
continuing "passive" stand "increasingly endangers the country's interests, in a region
where through the ages has shared a common ancestry, a common history, a common
culture, and consequently, a common fate with the Iranian nation"), available at http:/
/www.netiran.com/clippings.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
42. Mehdiyoun, supra note 1, at 185-86 (outlining Russia's 1991 - 1999 position as
evidence in the collective signing by the littoral states of the Alma Ata Declaration, Dec.
21, 1991, 31 ILM 148 (1992)).




newly independent states.45 This is because the newly independent
states would be reliant on Russia to some extent to ensure their
successful ventures in the Caspian region. 46 Indeed, both Russia
and Azerbaijan recently signed an agreement dividing their share
of the Caspian, bypassing Iran and Turkmenistan. 47
A similar agreement was signed between Russia and Kazakh-
stan earlier in May of 2002.4 8 The United States, being concerned
over Russia's considerable influence in forming such agreements,
recently warned Russia, urging it to rethink recent plans of chang-
ing the legal status of a huge oil link from Kazakhstan to Russia's
Black Sea port. The oil link, established by the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium, is a U.S.-backed private oil link on the territory of the
former Soviet Union.49
Unlike the newly independent states, Iran was relegated to the
most awkward of situations where it would be bound on one hand
to former agreements it had made with the Soviet Union 50 and on
the other hand faced with the fact that many parts of these histori-
cal agreements were jeopardized by the disintegration of the Soviet
Union.51 Iran's strange role in being required to negotiate with its
historically powerful northern neighbor and its newly independent
neighbors, each on a separate footing, make it understandable as to
45. Sabrina Tavernise, World Business Briefing, Eurape: Russia: Oil Exploration, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at WI (stating that Russian oil producer Lukoil, together with the
national oil and gas company of Kazakhstan, were beginning exploration in the Kazakh-
stan Kazmunaigez site. That site, located close to the center of the Caspian, is estimated
to contain recoverable reserves of over 700 million barrels in oil).
46. Id. (stating that Lukoil has already acquired stakes in 3 projects in Khazakstan,
including the TengizChevroil site which "is the largest oil development project in the
former Soviet Union including Russia.").
47. Steven Lee Myers, World Briefing / Europe: Russia: Carving up the Caspian, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at Al (stating that Iran and Turkmenistan have argued for a
broader multilateral agreement dividing the Caspian's resources where Iran insists on
equal division amongst the five nations but Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan argue
that the division should be based on the length of shorelines. Shoreline length division
would leave Iran and Turkmenistan smaller shares than the rest of the littoral states).
48. Id.
49. See http://www.forbes.com/markets/newswire/2002/11/20/rtr800488.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2002) ("The U.S.-backed CPC pipeline was built in 2001 and be-
came the first private oil link on the territory of the former Soviet Union. It is currently
shipping some 250,000 barrels per day (bpd) to world markets.").
50. Mizzi, supra note 3, at 488-89.
51. Id.
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why it may have been forced into the precarious position of being
"passive" in its previous negotiations, rather than voicing its reason
to competing interests.
5 2
Russian private corporations were also isolated when western
oil companies began to embark on lucrative collaborations with the
newly independent states.53 Consequently, many Russian oil pro-
ducers were absent from the Caspian region. 54 Former advisor to
President Mikhail Gorbachev, Andronik Migranyan, referred to this
as the "threefold defeat" of Russia, which included (1) a failure to
strengthen political forces in Azerbaijan that looked to Russia, (2)
the downgrading of Russia's official position as to the legal uncer-
tainty over the status of the Caspian when only its biggest oil pro-
ducer would participate in the Azerbaijan super projects, and (3)
the impossibility of preventing the arrival of the western
companies.
55
To some extent, Russia and Iran were similarly affected by the
emergence of the newly independent states in the Caspian.56 How-
ever, some argue that the volume of oil production within Russia
52. See Michael Lelyveld, Iran / Azerbaijan: U.S. rejects military involvement in Caspian
dispute, (Mar. 15, 2002), available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/03/1503
2002113328.asp (Describing the disputed territory of the Alov oil-field between Iran
and Azerbaijan. The article poses an interesting question as to what would happen if
Russia's LUKoil acquired a share of the Alov venture from Socar, Azerbaijan's state oil
company. The article inquired into whether Russia's investment would either silence
Iran, whom had sent gun ships into the area earlier, or raise further tensions making a
Caspian settlement even more remote. The article concluded by quoting a western offi-
cial who stated that "the presence of Russia in the southern Caspian would be seen as
strengthening Azerbaijan in its dealings with Iran.").
53. SeeJean-Christophe Peuch, The Privatization of International Affairs: Caspian Sea
Oil: The role of private corporations, 22 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 27, at 28 (1998).
54. See id. (arguing that Russia missed an opportunity whereby it allowed the
United States to take the lead in exploiting the Caspian in its collaborative efforts with
Azerbaijan).
55. Id. at 28 (stating that Russia's role was weakened in its influence over the Cas-
pian region).
56. Id. at 28-31 (Stating that the newly independent state of Azerbaijan holds a key
position due to its advanced economic relations with Western Europe and the United
States. American oil corporations showed interest in vast hydrocarbon reserves in the
Caspian immediately after the Soviet collapse. But Russia, like Iran, was not keen to
allow the newly independent states to freely engage in business with these corporations.
Because "Russia's private business still has to abide by what the Kremlin considers to be
its strategic interests or 'raisin d'Etat' ", and that policy may have "already bore some
fruits by frightening foreign investors.").
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far exceeds what the country could receive from participating in
the development of the Caspian deposits in the Azerbaijan sector.57
Accordingly, it comes as no surprise why Azerbaijan is more impor-
tant to Russia as a market rather than as an oil well. 58 The advan-
tages of Russia's "market theory" on Azerbaijan become even more
evident when one considers that the Caspian is landlocked. Because
the oil is worth more when it reaches world markets, exporters,
rather than producers, have as much if not more influence in the
Caspian dispute. 59 Thus, as Iran is further isolated in Caspian nego-
tiations due to a U.S. containment policy and exporter compliance
with the I.L.S.A., the error becomes evident in the idea that Iran's
past silence concerning Soviet oil operations somehow estopps it
from raising valid objections to similar operations by successor
states.
60
Though it is true that treaties established between Persia and
the Soviet Union are silent as to mining rights, this is only because
of the inadequacy in mining technology at the time the treaties
were enacted. 61 Even though serious oil exploitation in the Cas-
pian dates back to the 1850s, it was not until the 1980s that modern
technology made it apparent that deeper fields in the Caspian
would be lucrative investment projects once the oil became accessi-
ble.62 The intent of Iran and Russia to use these Caspian resources
on a shared basis can be inferred from repeated references in the
treaties to the Caspian as a "Soviet-Iranian" sea.63 Therefore, at
least to some extent, there is textual support for Iran's position in
the Caspian dispute. 64
One of the most persuasive reasons for creating a legal regime
for the Caspian modeled after a regional approach in the general
geographic area is that there will be more accountability for the
57. Id. at 30.
58. Id. at 30.
59. Id. at 29.
60. Mehdiyoun, supra note 1, 188-89 (arguing that in 1949 the Soviet Union en-
gaged in intensive oil operations in the Caspian without acquiring consent from Iran
and that Iran only aired its concerns as to oil pollution in the Caspian, but not as to the
operations per se).
61. Nourian, supra note 26, at 105, 111.
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environmental issues affecting the people living in the region. 65 To
this end, it is important that a multilateral rather than a unilateral
approach be adopted for purposes of dispute-resolution in this
area.66 However, the potentially sizeable damage to the region re-
sulting from exploitation of Caspian resources67 is not the only
point of contention for favoring a legal regime that focuses on a
regional approach. 68 Cooperation between all littoral states is re-
quired for a successful legal status that would bring stability to the
area.69
There are generally three broad approaches to resolving the
Caspian dispute.7 0 The first approach, as discussed above, favors
Iran's position of condominium.71 The second approach applies
the norms of international law, namely the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Seas (1982).72 This approach relies on classi-
fication of the Caspian as either an inland lake, in which case the
Law of the Seas would not apply, or as an "enclosed or semi-en-
65. Dubner supra note 11, at 289.
66. Id. at 289.
67. Id. at 289-91.
68. See Vinogradov, supra note 16 (Stating that the majority of Soviet republics
participate in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which is a loose organi-
zation that is not able to impose obligatory decisions or ensure unified policy in sensi-
tive areas like the Caspian. Nonetheless, the author stresses that the CIS Charter,
established just after the Soviet split, serves as a foundation for cooperation between the
CIS members in different areas, including protection of the environment. The article
goes on to say that the "framework" character of the Charter does not contain specific
rules regarding management and cooperation of shared natural resources and thus the
newly independent states created an institutional infrastructure consisting of the Inter-
state Ecological Council (IEC) and Interstate Ecological Fund (IEF) to work to that
end. At the first session, the IEC considered critical environmental issues and defined a
list of priority areas for future ecological cooperation, but too little had been done
within the framework of IEC which was ill-suited to deal with issues of shared natural
resource utilization and management. Instead of cooperation, the article acknowledged "a
marked trend towards a more limited, subregional or bilateral approach with regard to
transboundary water resources.").
69. Id.
70. Sanei, supra note 40, at 787, 801 and 806 (indicating the three "competing
macro-models" to be the (1) third United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas
(2) condominium and (3) Unique Caspian and the tailor made approach).
71. Id. at 802 (stating that "[ t]he principle of res communis or condominium may
be thought of as a doctrinal outgrowth of the commonage principle of the laws of the
sea").
72. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/conf.62/122,
Oct.7, 1982, U.N. Sales No. E. 83. V5., 21 ILM 1282 [hereinafter Convention].
[Vol. 48
THE CASPIAN DISPUTE
closed sea," which would make the Law of the Seas applicable,7 3
thereby establishing full maritime boundaries for the five littoral
states based on an equidistant division of the sea and undersea re-
sources into national sectors.74 A third approach is most flexible on
its face in that it presumes that the Caspian's geological characteris-
tics make it such a unique body of water that non-traditional ap-
proaches should be used to create a fresh legal mechanism in the
Caspian. 75 Such an approach, referred to by one author as involv-
ing the "unique Caspian and the tailor-made model," provides for
several possibilities.
76
73. Id. Convention, art. 122. Article 122 states, as follows:
PART IX
ENCLOSED OR SEMI-ENCLOSED SEAS
ARTICLE 122
Definition for the purposes of this Convention, "enclosed or semi-enclosed
sea" means a gulf basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and con-
nected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely
or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or
more coastal states.
Id. Convention, art. 122
74. But see William Constantinos Papadopoulos, International Law & Pipeline Geo-
politics in the Caspian Sea, 36 TEx.J. Bus. L. 1, 5-7 (1999) (Stating that the United Nation
Convention on the Law of the Seas, hereinafter UNCLOS III, does not clarify whether
the Caspian, an inland body of water, is an enclosed "sea" because of the rivers that flow
into the Caspian. For a "sea" to come under the definition of UNCLOS III, it is re-
quired that it be connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow "outlet." Thus,
UNCLOS III does not specify whether multiple rivers are considered an "outlet" and
the Caspian does not readily lend itself to the articles application.).
75. See Yolbars A. Kepbanov, The New legal status of the Caspian Sea is the basis of
regional operation and stability Perceptions J. INr'I AFF. (1998) http://www.mfa.gov.tr/
grupa/percept/ii4/I4-2.htm (last visited October 12, 2002) (arguing that since the
unique characteristics of the Caspian cannot be regulated by the existing international
legal norms and practices, one may hardly speak about the application of both norms of
international sea law and international practice of dividing frontier lakes).
76. Sanei, supra note 40, at 806-821 (conceptualizing a "legal spectrum of regime
models" that could govern the Caspian including:
Model 1: No sovereignty over waters and seabed; No commonage area
Model 2: No sovereignty over waters and seabed; Commonage area
Model 3: No sovereignty over waters and full sovereignty over seabed; Common-
age area
Model 4: No sovereignty over waters and partial sovereignty over seabed; Com-
monage area
Model 5: Partial sovereignty over waters and no sovereignty over seabed; Com-
monage area
Model 6: Full sovereignty over waters and no sovereignty over seabed; No com-
monage area
2004]
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The first approach to a resolution incorporating the principle
of res communis in the Caspian immediately manifests its problems
because there is little incentive for many of the littoral states to go
along given their respective shares of coastline in relation to their
ability to exploit those areas, not to mention the areas they have
already-begun to exploit.77 Furthermore, there is little case law sup-
porting condominium regime use and some argue that Iran's thirty-
year silence and lack of consent to the Soviet exploitation of Cas-
pian oil and gas off the coast of what is now Azerbaijan's city of
Baku 78 weakens the argument that Iran and the Soviet Union "in-
tended" common usage of the Caspian.
79
The second approach of equidistant division under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas fails for reasons already
mentioned; namely, that classification of the Caspian is subject to
different interpretations.8 0 Moreover, the littoral states have wholly
disregarded the potential applicability of the Law of the Sea to the
Caspian, as evident by their attempts to increase their maritime bor-
ders at the expense of their neighbors. 81 Countering a successful
application of this approach to the Caspian seabed, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan agreed in principle on an equidis-
tant-line division, but differed amongst themselves as to how that
Model 7: More sovereignty over waters than seabed; commonage area
Model 8: Full sovereignty over waters and partial sovereignty over seabed; No
commonage area
Model 9: Less sovereignty over waters and than seabed; Commonage area
Model 10: Partial sovereignty over waters and full sovereignty over seabed; No
commonage area
Model 11: Equal sovereignty over waters and seabed; Commonage area
Model 12: Full sovereignty over waters and seabed; No commonage area.).
77. Id. at 800-04 (Stating that the coastlines are roughly: Azerbaijan 15.2%, Iran:
18.7%, Kazakhstan 30.8%, Russia 18.5% and Turkmenistan 16.8%. Prior to 1991, de
facto division of coastlines between the Soviet Union and Iran was 80% and 20% respec-
tively. The break up of the Soviet resulted in a significant change in the distribution of
the Caspian).
78. Lelyveld, supra note 52.
79. Sanei, supra note 40, at 804 (stating that Russia and Iran base legitimacy of the
condominium approach on (1) the Soviet- Iranian Treaties and (2) historical, geo-
graphical and environmental characteristics of the Caspian).
80. Id. at 796 (stating that the provisions of the Law of Seas is applicable only to
seas and oceans pursuant to Article 1 and 2 of that Convention which defines such
jurisdictional capacity. thus, a strict application of that doctrine to determine the Cas-
pian's legal status would presume the Caspian to be analogous to a lake).
81. Papadopoulos, supra note 74, at 10.
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line should be drawn. 82 It becomes apparent that a pure applica-
tion of the Law of the Sea simply cannot resolve the dispute.
8 3 If
there must be an answer, it lies in the flexibility of the third
approach.
The Deputy Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan, Yolbars A.
Kepbanov, had stated early on that Turkmenistan understands the
"great economic interests" of its neighbors in exploiting the Cas-
pian's natural resources, but that this exploitation should yield to
mutual cooperation so that there is no detriment to other littoral
states.
8 4
To date, all countries have continued to embark on various
projects in the Caspian region. However, Deputy Foreign Minister
Kepbanov made an interesting proposal that offers insight into solv-
ing the problem of balancing cooperation amongst the littoral
states in light of unilateral actions exploiting Caspian resources.
According to Deputy Foreign Minister Kepbanov, it is well under-
stood that certain littoral states have exploited various sites along
the Caspian and that these sites could not simply be handed over,
even if there had been an accepted usage of the Caspian under a
legally binding agreement.8 5 Thus, he proposed that Turkmeni-
stan, for one, could take into account the fact that Azerbaijan had
already began working in various fields that may be in Turkmeni-
stan's jurisdiction and agree on a long-term leasing arrangement.8
6
Kepbanov understood that such devices were necessary to bring
back a legal system to the Caspian.8 7
The use of leasing arrangements in the Caspian is not an en-
tirely foreign concept.88 During the industrial age, where the Cas-
82. Mehdiyoun, supra note 1, at 187.
83. See Sanei, supra note 40.
84. See Kepbanov supra note 2; See also Mehdiyoun, supra note 1, at 187 (stating
that Turkmenistan understands and is not against Azerbaijan who has began extensive
work to exploit fields in the Caspian by creating an international consortium, but wants
Azerbaijan to recognize the jurisdiction of Turkmenistan over certain oil fields).
85. See Kepbanov supra note 2.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The Columbia Caspian Project: Oil and Environment Security in the Black and Cas-
pian Seas (Oct. 20, 1998) available at http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/RESOURCES/
CASPIAN/env_pl1.html (last visited April 2, 2003) (stating that the result of these leas-
ing arrangements were a "spectacular boom" giving rise to the city of Baku as its visible
monument - the fastest growing metropolitan center in the Russian Empire. The au-
2004]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
pian was under exclusive control of tsarist Russia, the government
leased oil-producing land to the highest bidder.8 9 However, to fully
understand the implications and necessity of leasing arrangements
in the Caspian now, we must begin with the premise that there has
been extensive American involvement in the Caspian region ever
since the Soviet collapse. 90 For example, in September of 1994, the
Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium signed an $8 billion dol-
lar, thirty-year contract to develop several promising oil fields in the
Caspian. 91 During that year, Azerbaijani President Aliev had of-
fered Iran a stake in this multibillion dollar international project,
but later revoked the offer because of U.S. pressure to exclude Iran
from the deal.9 2 Given the level of foreign participation that has
already accumulated in the Caspian region, it is impossible to have
a legal status that is purely determined by property division without
focusing on certain rights that have been acquired over time by ac-
quiescence in the region, rather than by express delegation and co-
operation between the littoral states.
93
thor next asks a question that still remains, "which market should be primary for the
Baku oil: Russia or the wide world?").
89. Id.
90. Sanei, supra note 40, at 708 (stating that "the United States and its political
allies" hold the Caspian region as "the key to the realization of a long-term strategic
agenda").
91. Papadopoulos, supra note 74, at 20, 23 (Stating that there has been increased
participation of American oil companies in Caspian ventures that has led foreign policy
in America to favor certain export routes over others. This led to American corporate
involvement in the Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli fields with the Azerbaijan International
Oil Consortium. The U.S. has avoided Russian and Iranian territory and promoted
other routes including the Baku-Supsa "western early oil" pipeline.).
92. See Peuch, supra note 39 (Stating that Iran had since accused Baku of being a
"tool of Washington and its regional allies in Turkey and Israel." The article quoted
Azerbaijan expert with the Moscow News, Sanobar Shermatova, who stated that Azerbai-
jan's decision to evict Iran from the deal marked a turning point in bilateral relations.
"The problem is that Iran is quite isolated on the international arena. This is first of all
due to its bad relations with the United States.").
93. Mizzi, supra note 3, at 495-96 (The article outlines what is referred to as the
"Tragedy of the Commons": The littoral states share common resources that are the
source of resource management problems and, at the same time, the potential basis for
an economic agreement for common management. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turk-
menistan share proprietary claims to common petroleum reserves and share the need
to use petroleum export systems. Russia and Iran claim historical rights to the caviar
and fisheries. In both situations, there is competition for a limited common resource
that results in accelerated exploitation with no incentive for efficient management.
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The Caspian is no longer a "sea" shared by two countries, nor a
body of water under a legal regime possessed by five countries, but
a cauldron of resources that is being exploited by an appreciable
number of private corporations and countries throughout the
world. A pure application of the rigid first and second approaches
outlined above simply will not work. They simply do not account
for the fact that there has been a drastic shift in the Caspian re-
gion's distribution of resources.
94
We further realize that the treaty history between Iran and the
former Soviet Union speak mostly to navigation and fishing rights,
and therefore cannot form the sole basis to a resolution in the
area.95 Nonetheless, in the quest to resolve the legal status of the
Caspian, a fair, if not mutually agreeable, solution for all entities
may be established if we incorporate a hybrid of either the first or
second approaches above, but only in the context of the more flexi-
ble third approach.
IV. INCORPORATING LEASING ARRANGEMENTS
The introduction of a complex scheme of leasing arrange-
ments into the dispute involving current Caspian projects is per-
haps the only way to effectuate a flexible approach a multi-lateral
resolution that will take into account years of unilateral exploita-
tion.96 The application of such a resolution benefits from hindsight
to create a legal regime by and for the littoral states, which have
been effected by over a decade of unilateral exploitation. The Cas-
pian region's legal status is sui generis and ultimately hinges on the
persisting differences in negotiating positions between the littoral
states, rather than on obligations arising under any treaty or law.
97
Many of the arguments outlining differences in negotiating po-
sitions, even the less popular position of Iran, are subject to analysis
that can contribute to a thorough examination and awareness of
Thus, the problem of the "tragedy of the commons" compliments the principle of trans-
action costs and holdouts in communal property ownership.).
94. See id.
95. Treaty of Commerce, supra note 14.
96. See Merzliakov, supra note 5.
97. Sievers, supra note 15, at 371-72 (stating that even if obligations did arise
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, only Russia had ratified
such a position).
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the current dispute in the Caspian region. Thus, to better establish
economic consequences that give rise to differences between each
littoral state's position, the most important task becomes establish-
ing a comprehensive review of all projects currently undertaken in
the Caspian, as well as all proposed projects. This would allow the
appraisal of net worth on each current project used to exploit the
Caspian. 98 Already the Caspian Environment Programme (CEP),
developed in 1995, has built on more than a decade of meetings by
policy makers and may even house the proper framework for this
information in its Programme Coordination Unit and Caspian Re-
gional Thematic Centers.99
Next, an in-depth review of leasing arrangement possibilities
must be analyzed with respect to current oil exploitation projects in
disputed areas of the Caspian that are manifest to all parties. 00
Many projects may be operating in unquestioned sovereign terri-
tory.101 By stipulating to what these particular areas are, both short-
term and long-term leasing arrangements between bordering coun-
tries can be reviewed with the ultimate goal of reaching a fair agree-
ment subject to mutual cooperation by neighboring countries. The
ultimate function of such arrangements is to provide a system that
serves the interests of creating a legal regime over the Caspian re-
98. I will not use this note to go into the logistics of how net worth can be deter-
mined. It is enough to say that "net worth" is a complex definition as applied to current
projects undertaken in the Caspian region and better left for more in depth analysis. It
should be noted that the idea of sharing all revenue from current projects undertaken
in the Caspian amongst the littoral states with a central regime was a concept first in-
volved in Part XI of the 1982 Law of the Sea treaty. This idea was meant to apply to
deep-sea development, but vetoed by Reagan Republicans; see also Michael Lelyveld,
Caspian: LUKoil Decision Unlikely To Affect Pipeline, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty,
available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/O5/O2052002085417.asp (May 2,
2002) (stating that proponents and opponents of the Baku-Tibilisi Ceylan project use
different figures to describe rate of returns in support of their decision to participate or
decline, with respect to this project, the article describes a difference between using an
"internal rate of return" and those measures yielding higher rates of 20% returns of
"equity," also known as "net worth").
99. Sievers, supra note 15, at 374 (stating that the Caspian Regional Thematic
Centers include Data and Information Systems and Legal, Regulatory, and Economic
Instruments. the Caspian Environment Programme effort has an emphasis in regional
cooperation, data management, environmental assessment and monitoring, and invest-
ment policy).




gion while allowing a compensating mechanism for countries that
have had their rights violated by unilateral actions already taken in
disputed areas by bordering states.
Finally, only after mapping out all current projects already un-
dertaken in the Caspian and assessing leasing arrangements in the
disputed sites between neighboring countries, proposed solutions
such as the 20% equal-share application proposed by Iran, or the
alternative equidistant division plan, can be reviewed and applied
based on informed decisions. 10 2 Thus, such proposals can be
viewed objectively, but only after leasing arrangements account for
current projects already undertaken in the Caspian region.
Once multilateral agreements were adopted, all operations in
disputed areas of the Caspian region would be subject to a lease,
but otherwise undisturbed. Of course, once a proposal for a legal
regime was accepted by all littoral states, this would be binding and
no one state could exploit resources outside its respective territorial
limits without reaching an agreement with their neighboring state.
This approach has the added benefit of bypassing the effects of uni-
lateral sanctions that prevent Iran from participating in oil consor-
tium projects.'03 Rather than being singled out and eliminated
from these projects by its neighboring states because of western in-
fluence,1 0 4 Iran can lease out its interest in the Caspian region.
Finally, it should be noted that incorporating leasing arrange-
ments into the Caspian dispute also brings about an effective alter-
native to transaction costs that would otherwise be present in a
communal rights system of division, Iran's more impracticable posi-
tion on what the legal status of the Caspian should be.1 0 5 Ulti-
102. Sanei, supra note 40, 804-05 (The author states that ".. .whatever the current
legal and practical effects of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties may be, they cannot be charac-
terized as having established a strict res communis regime in the Caspian ... Simply
put, straightforward application of a pure condominium regime is simply impractical in
the Caspian context because it allowsjoint ownership and management of both surface
and subsurface (including seabed and subsoil) resources. This impracticability is magni-
fied when the prospect of rich hydrocarbon reserves is introduced into the formula -
one could imagine a situation where vague and undetermined ownership rights ulti-
mately lead to chaos and possible military conflict." But, he then states that "[t]his does
not [ ] mean that aspects of a condominium macro-model cannot effectively be incor-
porated into a new regime containing aspects ofjoint cooperation and management.").
103. McCary, supra note 38.
104. Flyfish UK, supra note 36.
105. EIA Document, supra note 31.
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mately, a comprehensive scheme of leasing arrangements may be
the only instrument capable of turning back the hands of time and
placing all littoral states on an equal footing so to resolve the Cas-
pian dispute.
V. CONCLUSION
The legal status of the Caspian has been a point of contention
for over a decade now and the question still remains with almost as
much uncertainty as it did before.10 6 To date, many of the key is-
sues have centered on debate in legal scholarship engendering the
rigid choices of either (1) adhering to treaties signed by the former
Soviet Union and Iran, or (2) choosing whether the Caspian is a
body of water covered by the Law of the Sea Convention or gov-
erned by a "condominium approach." 10 7 Though there have been
approaches that encompass less of a "brightline" methodology to
resolving the Caspian dispute, 08 it is clear that few approaches, if
any, offer mechanisms that reverse the great disservice to mutual
cooperation that unilateral actions by the littoral states have cre-
ated. Foreign influence ensures that certain littoral states remain
isolated and ineffective in their influence over the Caspian re-
gion.10 9 Yet, what remains clear is that there is no room for extra-
territorial politics in the ultimate determination of what the legal
status should be. 110 Regional cooperation is still one of the only
106. See Caspian Law Document, supra note 28 (stating that the legal status of the
Caspian has hindered, but not stopped, further development of the Sea's mineral
resources).
107. Id.
108. Id. (acknowledging the need to develop a legal framework to resolve environ-
mental and biological issues).
109. McCary, supra note 38.
110. It would be worthy at the time of writing this note to foreshadow what role the
United States will play in light of "Operation Iraqi Freedom," but that is best left for
other papers; but see Charles van der Leeuw, Caspian ponders future amid anti-war senti-
ment, Caspian Business News, available at http://www.caspianbusinessnews.com/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2003) (Stating that the littoral states reacted differently to the bombing of
Baghdad. Where one stray American missile was claimed to have hit an Iranian oil refin-
ery, American sources hesitated to issue an apology. Instead, they stated that the matter
would be investigated. Kazakhstan, however, continued to show firm support and com-
mitment for the United States based on fundamental principles of "strategic partner-
ship," in hopes of an equitable and mutually beneficial tie with that country.).
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ways to bring back a legal regime to the Caspian."1 With the
proper framework for a legal system together with leasing arrange-
ments serving as effective redistribution mechanisms, a flexible ap-
proach can be undertaken which will create a new legal regime for
the Caspian over time, enforced by mutual agreement amongst all
littoral states.
111. Dubner, supra note 11.
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